We propose a truthful-in-expectation, (1 − 1 e )-approximation mechanism for the generalized assignment auction. In such an auction, each bidder has a knapsack valuation function and bidders' values for items are private. We present a novel convex optimization program for the auction which results in a maximal-in-distributional-range (MIDR) allocation rule. The presented program contains at least a (1 − 1 e ) ratio of the optimal social welfare. We show how to implement the convex program in polynomial time using a fractional local search algorithm which approximates the optimal solution within an arbitrarily small error. This leads to an approximately MIDR allocation rule which in turn can be transformed to an approximately truthful-in-expectation mechanism. Our contribution has algorithmic importance, as well; it simplifies the existing optimization algorithms for the GAP while the approximation ratio is comparable to the best given approximation.
Introduction
In algorithmic mechanism design, a mechanism designer wishes to solve an optimization problem, but the inputs to this problem are the private information of self-interested players. The mechanism designer must thus design a mechanism that solves the optimization problem while encouraging the agents to reveal their information truthfully. The game-theoretic solution concept of truthfulness guarantees that an agent is better off truthfully interacting with the mechanism regardless of what the other agents do.
We consider the generalized assignment problem as a combinatorial auction. In the generalized assignment problem (GAP), a set of items should be assigned to a set of bidders in order to maximize total valuation. Each bidder associates a different value and weight to each item and has a limited capacity. We can assign each bidder any subset of items that does not exceed the bidder's capacity. For every such subset, the bidder's valuation is additive in the values of items in the subset. We assume bidders' valuations for items to be private while weights and capacities are publicly known. Our goal is to find an allocation and payment rule which constitute a truthful-in-expectation mechanism for the GAP.
The well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) technique provides truthfulness as well as social welfare maximization in every combinatorial auction. The VCG technique, however, is applicable only when the optimal social welfare can be computed efficiently. Yet, in many cases, including our problem, optimizing social welfare is computationally intractable which makes the VCG technique inapplicable. Usually, when faced with computational intractability, computer scientists turn to approximations or heuristics. Unfortunately, the VCG technique cannot be applied to approximate solutions [1] .
The best for a mechanism designer is to devise a computationally efficient and truthful mechanism with an approximation factor that (very closely) matches the best one known for the problem in which the underlying data is publicly known. In many cases it has been shown that it is impossible to achieve the same approximation factor in incentive-compatible mechanisms [2, 3, 4, 5, 6] .
From an algorithmic point of view, the generalized assignment problem has been studied extensively in the literature. Chekuri and Khanna [7] made it explicit that the algorithm of Shmoys and Tardos [8] can be adapted to give a 2-approximation. Later, Fleischer et al. [9] improved the factor to 1 − 1 e . Using a reduction to submodular maximization subject to a matroid constraint, Calinescu et al. [10] achieved a ratio of 1 − 1 e − o(1) without using the ellipsoid method which was pivotal in [9] . An algorithm due to Feige and Vondrák [11] yields an approximation factor of 1 − 1 e + ρ, ρ ≈ 10 −180 which is the best given approximation ratio for the GAP. Chakrabarty and Goel [12] gave the best known hardness result, showing that it is NP-hard to approximate GAP to any factor better than 10 11 . We observe that all aforementioned algorithms consist of two algorithms, a relaxation algorithm and a rounding algorithm. This type of algorithms usually cannot constitute a truthful mechanism, since the rounding component is not monotone. For instance, suppose x is a fractional feasible solution with value more than y, i.e. i v i (x) > i v i (y). However, the relation might be inverse when the rounding procedure r is applied to the fractional solutions:
where X ∼ r(x) and Y ∼ r(y). Such a rounding procedure is non-monotone and the algorithm thus is not directly applicable to mechanism design.
In order to devise truthful mechanisms, Dughmi et al. [13] propose an approach which optimizes directly on the outcome of the rounding algorithm, rather than over the outcome of the relaxation algorithm. Since the rounding procedure is embedded into the objective function, this approach is not always computationally tractable. Yet, assuming that the optimization problem can be solved efficiently, this approach always leads to an MIDR algorithm. MIDR or maximal-indistributional-range is the only known general approach for designing randomized truthful mechanisms. An MIDR algorithm fixes a set of distributions over feasible solutions (the distributional range) independently of the valuations reported by the self-interested players, and outputs a random sample from the distribution that maximizes expected (reported) welfare [14] .
Lavi and Swamy [15] proposed a general method for deriving MIDR mechanisms from linear programming relaxations. They solve the relaxed problem in the first step and then they use a very special rounding method (convex decom-position) to obtain the randomized integral allocation. Although they are also using the common composition of relaxation and rounding algorithms, their special rounding procedure produces an expected allocation which is always identical to the scaled down input to the rounding algorithm, component-wise, and this interestingly guarantees truthfulness-in-expectation. In contrast to the approach of [13] , it is straightforward to design a truthful mechanism using this framework, however it is not obvious how to apply the framework to the settings where bidders have private structured valuations such as submodular function valuations.
Our Results and Techniques
Despite all the impossibility results in the field of algorithmic mechanism design, in this paper, we present a truthful-in-expectation randomized mechanism for the generalized assignment problem.
In order to achieve a MIDR, we directly optimize over the outcome of the rounding procedure, rather than over the outcome of the relaxation algorithm. To this end, we formulate the GAP as a convex optimization problem where the objective function equals the expected value of the rounding procedure. This is similar to the technique used in [13] for finding a truthful-in-expectation mechanism for players whose valuations are of a special type of submodular functions. We notice that our technique allows to guarantee non-negativity of payments and individual rationality, ex post, while in [13] , these important properties are provided only ex ante.
We are able to approximate the proposed convex optimization problem within an arbitrarily small error, in the sense of an FPTAS. This in fact leads to an approximate MIDR as mentioned in the following. Theorem 1. There is a (1 − ǫ)-MIDR allocation rule that achieves a (1 − 1 e − ǫ)approximation to the social welfare in the generalized assignment problem, for every ǫ = 1/poly(m, n).
It has been shown in [16] how to transform an approximately MIDR allocation rule to an approximately truthful-in-expectation mechanism. Taking into account this black box transformation, we immediately conclude that Theorem 2. There is a (1 − ǫ)-truthful-in-expectation mechanism that achieves a (1 − 1 e − ǫ)-approximation to the social welfare in the generalized assignment problem, for every ǫ = 1/poly(m, n).
We remark that our result has algorithmic importance, as well. It has advantages over the previously known optimization algorithms in terms of runtime and simplicity. Our algorithm does not employ the ellipsoid method which is pivotal in [9] . Moreover, the algorithm improves over that of [10] , since in the algorithm of [10] , in each iteration, a random sampling is required to compute the residual increase of assigning an item to a bidder, which increases runtime. The residual increase is treated as an approximate evaluation of gradient of the objective function at a point. This residual increase is in fact calculated by taking the average of (mn) 5 independent samples, where m and n are the number of items and bidders, respectively. However, we use a novel objective function which is specified exactly, rather than by random sampling, therefore it is possible to calculate the gradient of the objective function explicitly, which helps in simplifying the algorithm and improving the runtime.
Preliminaries
In the generalized assignment problem (GAP), there are n bidders, I, and m items, J. Let v ij denote the value of bidder i for item j. Each bidder i has a different weight w ij for each item j and has a limited capacity C i . Let F i denote the collection of all feasible assignments to bidder i , i.e. ∀S ∈ F i : j∈S w ij ≤ C i . Every item can be assigned to only one bidder.
We assume bidders' valuations for items are private while weights and capacities are publicly known.
An allocation (S 1 , . . . , S n ), where S i ⊆ J denotes the subset assigned to bidder i, is feasible if ∀i ∈ I : S i ∈ F i and {S i } i∈I are mutually disjoint. The knapsack valuation is defined as
With an slight abuse of notation, we sometimes use
Due to the revelation principle, we limit ourselves to direct revelation mechanisms. Every mechanism has two main components: an allocation rule and a payment rule. The allocation rule A is a function which maps a reported valuation v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) to an allocation (S 1 , . . . , S n ), where ∀i : v i = (v ij ) j∈J . The payment rule is a function from reported valuations to a required payment from each bidder. Let p i denote the payment rule function for bidder i.
Definition 1 (Maximal in Distributional Range (MIDR)). Given reported valuations v 1 , . . . , v n , and a previously-defined probability distribution over feasible sets R, a MIDR returns an outcome that is sampled randomly from a distribution D * ∈ R that maximizes the expected welfare E x∼D [ i g i (x)] over all distributions D ∈ R [14] .
Analogously, we define (1 − ǫ)-MIDR as follows.
Definition 2 ((1−ǫ)-MIDR). Given reported valuations v 1 , . . . , v n , and a previouslydefined probability distribution over feasible sets R, a (1 − ǫ)-MIDR returns an outcome that is sampled randomly from a distribution D * ∈ R that
The expectation in (3) is taken over the coin flips of the mechanism.
Our goal is to find an allocation and payment rule which constitute a truthfulin-expectation mechanism for the GAP that approximates the social welfare as much as possible.
MIDR Allocation Rule for the GAP
We optimize directly over the expected value of the allocation produced by the rounding algorithm. We let the relaxed feasible set be R as follows. Given a vector
In effect, in R one randomized feasible set is assigned to each bidder i. The sets assigned to different players may overlap, however in the rounding step, as we explain next, each item is assigned only once. We wish to maximize the expected value of the rounded allocation over range R. This leads to an MIDR allocation, since we maximize over a range which is independent of the players' private information. Let call the rounding algorithm as r greedy . Algorithm 1 presents the desired MIDR algorithm.
Algorithm 1: MIDR allocation rule for the generalized assignment problem.
Proposition 1. Algorithm 1 is an MIDR allocation rule.
As we show in the following, interestingly, this optimization problem is tractable. We attempt to explain step by step how to implement Algorithm 1 and how good the outcome of the algorithm is. We first start explaining the rounding procedure.
Greedy Rounding
We choose a rounding algorithm which preserves a good ratio of the fractional solution while it returns a feasible allocation in which each item is assigned only once. We first define helper function φ(·) which maps a point in R to a point in
The rounding procedure called greedy rounding has two steps. In the first step, given a point x ∈ R it finds another point x ′ ∈ R such that ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J :
In the second step, the rounding procedure assigns subset S to bidder i with probability x ′ i,S while resolving conflicts as explained in Algorithm 3.
To do the first step, we propose Algorithm 2. Algorithm 2 takes a point x ∈ R and a desired vector y ′ ∈ [0, 1] I×J , where y ′ φ(x) and returns another point
Algorithm 2: An oblivious method for finding a dominated point in R.
The following lemma confirms that Algorithm 2 returns the desired outcome. Lemma 1. Suppose x ∈ R with polynomially-many x i,S > 0, and y ′ ∈ [0, 1] I×J such that y ′ φ(x). If we call Algorithm 2 on x and y ′ , it returns x ′ ∈ R such that φ(x ′ ) = y ′ with only polynomially-many x ′ i,S > 0. Proof. If the algorithm terminates we will have ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J: δ ij = 0, and therefore y ′ = φ(x ′ ). Thus, we only need to show that the algorithm terminates in polynomial time and x ′ has polynomially-many positive components. We show it for one bidder and one item and since the number of items and bidders is polynomial, we obtain the desired conclusion.
Fix bidder i and item j. We consider one iteration in which x ′ i,S with j ∈ S is chosen. Two cases can happen. First, x ′ i,S < δ ij . In this case, the number of positive components in x ′ does not increase, since x i,S becomes zero and at most another positive component is added: x ′ i,S\{j} . Moreover, this case can happen as many times as the number of x i,S:j∈S > 0, which are only polynomially-many by assumption.
Second, x ′ i,S ≥ δ ij . In this case, only one new positive component may be added: x ′ i,S\{j} . But, this case can happen only once for item j, as δ ij becomes zero in this step.
Thus, in total for bidder i and item j, only one new positive component might be included in x ′ compared to x and the number of iterations is polynomial. This completes the proof.
⊓ ⊔
For the first step of the rounding algorithm, therefore we call Algorithm 2 on inputs x and y ′ ∈ [0, 1] I×J where ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J: y ′ ij = 1 − e −yij and y = φ(x), to obtain the desired point in R. Notice, that y ′ y.
Now, we are ready to present the greedy rounding algorithm, r greedy .
Algorithm 3: Greedy rounding algorithm, r greedy .
Data: x ∈ R with polynomially-many
Invoke Algorithm (2) with x and y ′ as the inputs and let x ′ be the result. 2. Independently for each bidder i, assign set S to i with probability x ′ i,S . If some item j is assigned to more than a bidder, assign it to the bidder among these bidders with the maximum value v ij . Let S i be the set assigned to bidder i. return (S 1 , . . . , S n ).
In order to analyze the performance of the rounding algorithm, we define a new function.
Where σ j : I → I is a permutation on I such that v σj (i),j is decreasing (nonincreasing) when i runs from 1 to n, and v σj (n+1),j = 0.
Function F (·) is useful in explaining the quality of the rounding algorithm as shown in the following. Lemma 2. ∀x ∈ R : E (S1,...,Sn)∼r greedy (x) i∈I
Proof. Assume x ∈ R. Let x ′ be the outcome of Step 1 of Algorithm 3. Let y = φ(x) and y ′ = φ(x ′ ). We calculate the expected value achieved from the assignment of item j in the integral allocation. Fix item j. For simplicity, we assume that σ j (i) = i. That means, bidders with smaller indices have higher valuations for j. We find the expected value returned from item j; for other items, the argument is similar. With probability y ′ 1j the set assigned to bidder 1 contains j thus j is assigned to 1. Recall that y ′ 1j = S:j∈S x ′ 1,S . Therefore, with probability y ′ 1j , the value of returned allocation is v 1j . With probability (1 − y ′ 1j )y ′ 2j the set assigned to bidder 1 does not contain the item and the set assigned to bidder 2 contains it and therefore item j is assigned to bidder 2. This case leads to a returned value of (1 − y ′ 1j )y ′ 2j v 2j . Continuing similarly for other bidders, the achievable expected value becomes
). The equality of the two terms can be observed by simply extending the latter. Taking into account that y ′ ij = 1 − e −yij , and summing over all items we obtain the desired conclusion, using linearity of expectation.
⊓ ⊔ Therefore, we need to optimize F (φ(x)) over x ∈ R. Optimizing F (φ(x)) over x ∈ R is essentially the same as optimizing F (y) over y ∈ P, where
Thus, what remains is to explain how to solve max y∈P F (y), and the quality of the solution.
The Approximation Ratio
We show the quality of the method by comparing max y∈P F (y) to the optimal solution to the configuration LP of the GAP.
The configuration LP of the GAP is as follows:
GAP-CLP: max i∈I,S∈Fi
i∈I,S∈Fi:j∈S
To be able to compare GAP-CLP to F (y), first we introduce a new variable into the program and then we rearrange the objective function.
Let y ∈ [0, 1] I×J be such that ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J : y ij = S∈Fi:j∈S x i,S . Using this new variable we define polytope P ′ as in the following:
We notice that P ′ ⊆ P since P ′ has an additional constraint (Constraint (1)). Now, we rearrange the objective function of GAP-CLP to be a function of items (y) rather than subsets, (x). i∈I,S∈Fi
We observe that solving GAP-CLP is equivalent to finding max
Now, we are ready to compare max y∈P F (y) with the optimal integral solution to the GAP (denoted by OP T ).
The first inequality holds since P ′ ⊆ P. The last inequality holds because max y∈P ′ i∈I,j∈J v ij y ij in fact returns a solution to GAP-CLP which is obviously greater than OP T . For the second inequality, consider item j and y ∈ P ′ . For simplicity, we assume ∀i : σ j (i) = i. We have n i=1 y ij ≤ 1, since y ∈ P ′ . Considering the fact that 1 − e −x ≥ (1 − 1 e )x for x ∈ [0, 1], we obtain
Summing both sides, we obtain
Obtaining this inequality for all items, and summing them up, we obtain the desired conclusion.
⊓ ⊔
Thus, what remains is to show how to maximize F (y) over y ∈ P which is the topic of Section 3.3.
Solving the Convex Optimization Problem
We wish to solve max y∈P F (y) which is essentially equivalent to the following mathematical optimization problem:
∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J :
S∈Fi:j∈S
First, we show that GAP-CONVEX is a convex optimization problem. All constraints in the program are linear thus we only need to show that the objective function, F (y), is concave/convex which is shown by the following theorem. Proof. The function is concave, since it is a non-negative weighted sum of functions which are compositions of the concave function 1 − e −x with affine function x → i k=1 y σj (k),j (see [17] ).
In order to solve the convex optimization problem, we present a fractional local search algorithm. Our algorithm gets arbitrarily close to the optimal solution. The difficulty in solving the convex optimization problem mostly arises from the exponential number of variables in the convex program. As a result, we are able to implement a (1 − ǫ)-MIDR allocation rule, for any ǫ = 1/poly(m, n).
We present a fractional local search algorithm similar to that of [16] . However, we have to deal with a somewhat more involved polytope. Our algorithm employs a polynomial number of iterations to get as close as a predefined precision to the optimal solution. In every iteration of the algorithm, we need to find y * ∈ P which maximizes y · ∇F (y) 1 over all y ∈ P. Proposition 2 tells us that maximizing y · v over all y ∈ P for every cost function v, is equivalent to finding set S * i ∈ F i for every bidder i which maximizes j∈S * i v ij .
The first equality holds since for every y ∈ P, there exists x ∈ R where y = φ(x).
The last equality holds since if x ∈ R then S∈Fi x i,S ≤ 1.
⊓ ⊔
Finding max{ j∈S v ij : S ∈ F i } is essentially solving a knapsack subproblem for bidder i. To do so, we invoke the FPTAS for the knapsack problem. We say KnapsackFptas(v i , ǫ), for any v i = (v ij ) j∈J and 0 < ǫ < 1 returns subset
We store the computed vector in each iteration in a set Z. We keep the size of Z to be of at most 1 δ for δ = 1 n . As long as |Z| < 1 δ we simply add the current vector to Z. When |Z| = 1 δ , in each iteration we add the current vector and remove one vector from Z which has the least value with respect to the current gradient. The solution returned by the algorithm, x, has the property that y = φ(x) is a convex combination of the vectors in Z: y = δ · z∈Z z. We continue updating Z until the increase in F (y) gets below a predefined threshold. Now, we present the main algorithm. Let M denote max{v ij : i ∈ I; j ∈ J}. Proof. We observe that the set Z contains at most 1 δ elements; as long as |Z| < 1 δ , one element z is included into the set and when |Z| = 1 δ , one element is added and one element is removed from the set.
Algorithm 4: Fractional local search algorithm
Towards the end of algorithm (Step 4), for each z ∈ Z and each bidder i, one positive component (x i,S ) is increased up to δ which in turn means for each bidder i we have S∈Fi x i,S ≤ 1 δ · δ = 1. That means x ∈ R, the desired conclusion. ⊓ ⊔ Lemma 6. Algorithm 4 returns x ∈ R such that F (φ(x)) ≥ (1−o(1)) max{F (y)|y ∈ P}.
Proof. Assume x is the outcome of the algorithm. According to Lemma 5, x ∈ R. Let y = φ(x). Let z be the calculated vector in the last iteration in Step 2, i.e. (z − y) · ∇F (y) ≤ ǫM .
Let y * = arg max y∈P F (y). According to Proposition 2, z · ∇F (y) ≥ (1 − ǫ) max w∈P w · ∇F (y). Hence, z · ∇F (y) ≥ (1 − ǫ)y * · ∇F (y). Thus, we get
The first inequality is because of the concavity of F . The third inequality holds since (z − y) · ∇F (y) ≤ ǫM , and y · ∇F (y) < mM . If y · ∇F (y) ≥ mM then, by concavity of F , F (y) ≥ y · ∇F (y) ≥ mM ≥ F (y * ), and therefore the lemma holds. Notice, mM is an upper bound for F (y * ). Now, using ǫ = 1 2mn , we obtain F (y * ) − F (y) ≤ 1 n M ≤ 1 n F (y * ). Hence, when the algorithm terminates F (y) ≥ (1 − o(1))F (y * ), the desired conclusion.
Consider an iteration of the algorithm in which a vector z is computed, denoted by t. Let y(t) denote the value of y at the beginning of iteration t. The change in y in iteration t, i.e., y(t + 1) − y(t) is either δz or δ(z − z min ) for |Z| < 1 δ and |Z| = 1 δ , respectively. The change in gradient, however, has a certain upper bound when y changes by a certain amount, as Lemma 7 shows. . That means, ∇F (y(t+1)) ≥ e −nδ ∇F (y(t)).
Proof. Consider the gradient of F . For simplicity, we assume that σ j (i) = i. .
Consequently, ∇F (y(t + 1)) ≥ e −nδ ∇F (y(t)). ⊓ ⊔ Lemma 8. In each iteration, the value of F (y) increases by at least 1 6mn 2 M .
Proof. As long as the algorithm continues we have (z − y) · ∇F (y) > ǫM . First, we consider the case where |Z| < 1 δ . We have
The first inequality is because of the concavity of F . The second inequality holds because of Lemma 7. The third inequality is because (z − y) · ∇F (y) > ǫM implies that z · ∇F (y) > ǫM , as we always have ∇F (y) ≥ 0.
Second, we consider the case where |Z| = 1 δ . We have
The first inequality is because of the concavity of F . The second inequality holds because of Lemma 7. The third inequality is because (z − z min ) · ∇F (y) ≥ (z − y) · ∇F (y), as shown in the following.
By definition of z min , z min · ∇F (y) ≤ z ′ · ∇F (y) for all z ′ ∈ Z. Thus, |Z| · z min · ∇F (y) ≤ z ′ ∈Z z ′ · ∇F (y), which in turn means z min · ∇F (y) ≤ y · ∇F (y). Observe that y = δ · z ′ ∈Z z ′ . Now, using ǫ = 1 2mn and δ = 1 n , we obtain F (y(t + 1)) ≥ F (y(t)) + 1 6mn 2 M. This completes the proof. ⊓ ⊔ Lemma 9. After at most 6m 2 n 2 iterations, Algorithm 4 terminates.
Proof. Since M denotes max{v ij : i ∈ I; j ∈ J}, mM is an upper bound for max y∈P F (y). Recall that max y∈P F (y) = max x∈R E (S1,...,Sn)∼r greedy (x) i∈I
Moreover, based on Lemma 8, in each iteration the growth in value is at least 1 6mn 2 M , the algorithm thus in at most 6m 2 n 2 iterations, reaches the value of mM , which is an upper bound on the best solution. This concludes the proof. ⊓ ⊔ Thus, we achieve a (1 − ǫ)-MIDR allocation rule that runs in polynomial time. This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
Simplifying the Rounding Procedure
We remark that it is possible to simplify the rounding procedure (Algorithm 3), further. The simplified rounding is as follows.
Given x ∈ R, let y = φ(x). We assign set S to each bidder i independently with probability x i,S . Next, for each item j we do as follows. If item j is assigned to bidder i, we let the bidder hold the item with probability 1−e −y ij yij . That means, we withdraw the item from the bidder with probability 1 − 1−e −y ij yij . This way we make sure that the probability of assigning item j to bidder i is not y ij but 1 − e −yij which is necessary to maintain the MIDR property; the MIDR principle requires that the expected value of the randomized integral assignment equals the calculated fractional value. Finally, if some item j is assigned to more than a bidder, we assign it to the bidder among these bidders with the maximum value v ij .
We also remark that, in order to use the allocation rule algorithm (Algorithm 1) as an optimization algorithm, one can employ a simpler rounding algorithm. The simpler rounding requires only Step 2 of Algorithm 3. For an optimization purpose, there is no need to also execute Step 1 of the greedy rounding algorithm. Thus, after finding a fractional solution x by invoking Algorithm 4, we assign set S to each bidder i with probability x i,S and resolve conflicts similar to the technique in the greedy rounding algorithm. This improves the runtime for the optimization purpose.
Computing Payments
Supplementing the MIDR allocation rule of Section 3 with VCG payments yields a truthful-in-expectation mechanism. We compute payments in order to also enforce non-negative payments and individual rationality, ex post.
To compute the VCG fractional payment p F i for bidder i, we need to compute two components: first, the Clarke pivot, h i (v −i ), which is the best achievable social welfare by bidders other than i, and second, the value gained by bidders other than bidder i in the current fractional solution. We can calculate h i (v −i ) by solving GAP-CONVEX by also adding constraint x i,S = 0 for all S ∈ J. To compute the value gained by other bidders in the fractional allocation, F −i (y * ), we set ∀j ∈ J : v ij = 0 in F (y * ), assuming that y * is the outcome of Algorithm 4. We notice that function F (y) is explicitly known to us and we can set v ij to 0 in it. Finally, p F i = h i (v −i ) − F −i (y * ). The value gained by bidder i in the fractional allocation is therefore w F i = F (y * ) − F −i (y * ). Assuming that S i is the subset assigned to bidder i by the rounding procedure, we can compute the randomized payment for bidder i, p i , satisfying individual rationality and non-negativity of payments as follows.
